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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
On 9 October 2008, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling unprecedentedly 
invoked the UK anti-terrorism laws to freeze the UK assets of the collapsed Icelandic Bank, 
Landsbanki Islands. This action was to protect the deposit savings of UK residents who had 
invested in the bank’s online savings branch, Icesave. The nadir of the Icelandic banking 
system, which over the previous decade had enjoyed spectacular growth, was fast approaching. 
For a short time, Iceland had become an important international financial centre and the banking 
system came to dominate the small Icelandic economy. At its zenith, shortly before the banking 
collapse in 2008, the consolidated financial assets of the three big banks (Glitnir, Kaupthing and 
Landsbanki) were over nine times the size of Iceland’s GDP (Dwyer 2011). The exceptionally 
fast rate of growth of Iceland’s banking system over the period 2003-2008 is evidenced by the 
fact that five years earlier the ratio of assets to GDP was less than two. Briefly, for a short time, 
the banking system brought unparalleled prosperity to the country. In 2008, the country’s per 
capita income exceeded that of the United States, but the growth had been accompanied by 
increased income inequality with the increasing importance of the banking sector.1 The banks 
collapsed on the 8 and 9 October 2006 and the bankruptcy of the three banks is the third largest 
in the world, after Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual. 
The purpose of this paper is not primarily to discuss the causes and consequences of the 
Icelandic banking collapse, as these are by now well known.2 Instead, the focus of this paper is 
on why some economists anticipated the crash and others were more sanguine. Many of these 
concerns of the economists were expressed in public meetings and lectures in Iceland, in reports 
or on blogs. In particular, we shall consider the views of Wade and his co-author, 
Sigurgeirsdóttir, (2009; 2010; 2012 a & b) who subsequently expressed why they had a number 
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1
 Much of the gains of financialisation went to the already wealthy. The Gini coefficient increased from 
24.1 in 2004 to 29.6 in 2009. The share of income of the top one percent of the population increased from 
5 percent in 2000 to 20 percent in 2008. 
2
 There is a comprehensive literature on this topic. The most notable is the report of the Special 
Investigatory Commission (SIC), a report of several volumes to the Icelandic Parliament published in 
2010. The SIC were given unprecedented access to all relevant financial documents and took extensive 
evidence from the major players. It is fair to say that the causes of the Icelandic banking crisis are now 
better understood than those of any other financial crisis. Only short, but informative, excerpts of the SIC 
report are available in English. Fortunately, Johnsen (2014), who was the Senior Researcher with the SIC, 
has written a detailed book of the crisis based on the SIC findings. The OECD (2009) survey of Iceland 
provides a discussion of the issues surrounding the collapse and Jännäri (2009) considers the performance 
of the regulatory system. We also do not discuss the subsequent events following the crisis, which are 
covered by Sigurgeirsdóttir /Wade (2015) and McCombie/Spreafico (2016). 
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of major concerns about the viability of the Icelandic banking system and the effectiveness of its 
regulation. However, it should be noted that Wade had expressed these concerns in public 
lectures in Iceland as early as 2005. 
In 2006 there was the so-called short-lived ‘mini-crisis’, precipitated by a temporary loss of 
confidence in the Icelandic banks by the international financial markets and international rating 
agencies (Fitch and Moody’s). The Danske Bank, the largest Danish bank, was so concerned 
about the Icelandic banking situation that, although Iceland was not one of their core research 
areas, its research department issued a report in March 2006 entitled ‘Iceland: Geyser Crisis’. 
Part of its concern was due the rapid growth of the banking sector and part to the rapidly 
deteriorating macroeconomic situation.  
All these raised important issues about the viability of the Iceland banking system. The SIC 
has shown that the government, the Central Bank of Iceland and the financial regularity body 
(FME) were at that time aware of the fundamental problems. However, they largely sought to 
counteract these with an orchestrated campaign to show that these concerns were ill-founded. 
Most notably, the Iceland Chamber of Commerce commissioned two reports, one by Mishkin, 
and his co-author Herbertsson (May 2006) and the other by Portes/Baldursson, with Ólafsson 
(November 2007).3 For convenience, we shall refer to these reports as Mishkin (2006) and 
Portes (2007). Both, these two reports each came to diametrically opposite conclusions to those 
sounding alarm bells. With a few minor reservations, both reports gave Icelandic banking a 
clean bill of health and any overseas investor accepting the conclusions of both these reports 
would not have had any reservations about keeping money in one of the Icelandic banks. 
There is no doubt that these reports were very influential. They were not some obscure 
academic reports, but were widely cited by the Icelandic government, inter alios, and used to 
persuade investors and the other central banks that the Iceland banking system was sound. The 
SIC, for example, implies that the Mishkin report was sufficiently influential that it had a role in 
ending the mini-crisis, and, implicitly, may have induced unwarranted confidence in the 
banking system. Indeed, there is little doubt that Mishkin’ s report ‘played a role in helping the 
Icelandic Banks to continue to borrow’ (Ferguson 2012: 254). The Prime Minister of Iceland, 
for example, informed the 2008 annual meeting of the Central Bank of Iceland that the 
‘prospects are good’ and this ‘has been thoroughly confirmed by well-known scientists such as 
 
3
 Mishkin was paid a fee of $135,000 and Portes was paid £58,000 for their reports respectively 
(Wade/Sigurgeirsdóttir 2010: 16, fn. 16 and 17, fn. 17 respectively). Mishkin disclosed the payment only 
when he was ‘required to, on the government financial disclosure form required by the Federal Reserve 
Board’ (Ferguson 2012: 253). These reports were given prominence in Ferguson’s documentary Inside 
Job and his book of the same name (Ferguson 2012) where he pointed out that these payments may well 
have led to a conflict of interest and should have been disclosed at the time of publication.
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Frederic Mishkin, who has become governor of the US Federal Reserve, and Richard Portes, the 
well-known academic expert in the field’ (cited by Wade/Sigurgeirsdóttir, 2010: 5). Morgan 
Stanley stated that the Mishkin report had reassured them that ‘Iceland does not display 
meltdown characteristics’ (Jónsson, 2009: 79). 
Wade, among others, comes to a completely opposite conclusion. Wade adopts a political 
economy approach to the crisis. In a series of papers, he and Sigurgeirsdóttir have looked in 
detail at the historical political and economic changes in the Icelandic economy, including who 
were the beneficiaries of privatization of the banks and the network of connections between the 
power and financial elite, suggesting that these were important factors in the collapse. They 
trace how political connections over the decades dominated economic life in Iceland. 
Paradoxically, even as liberalization was introduced, this did not weaken the grip of the power 
and financial elite on the control of the economy. While a few other economists expressed 
concern about the Icelandic banking system immediately prior to its collapse, largely on account 
of its rapid growth, Wade and Sigurgeirsdóttir virtually alone correctly saw that the problems 
fundamentally stemmed from the close political and financial networks that existed in Iceland. 
(See, for example, Wade, 2009 and Wade/ Sigurgeirsdóttr, 2010 and 2012a).  The close 
financial connections were dramatically confirmed by the SIC’s detailed analysis of the 
extensive overlapping ownership links between Icelandic firms. (Johnsen, 2014:  chapter 10). 
 In an op-ed in the Financial Times in July 2008a, Wade summarised many of the problems of 
the Icelandic banking system arising from poor regulation and conflicts of interest in the 
ownership of the banks. This drew a response from Baldursson/Portes (2008) who, in a letter 
published in the Financial Times, asserted that ‘Robert Wade gets Iceland very wrong’. 
According to them, even as late as the latter part of 2008, the macroeconomic indicators were 
sound and there was effective bank regulation. Much of Wade’s op-ed was dismissed as 
‘political, including rumour-mongering’ by Baldursson/ Portes. However, Wade’s concerns 
were echoed by Gylfason (2008) and Zoega (2008). The former was concerned about the rapid 
expansion of the banks, the latter about the unsustainable credit boom. A mere three months 
after Baldursson and Portes’ strong reassurances, the Icelandic banking system collapsed. 
This raises two issues. The first is the extent to which the impending crisis should have been 
foreseen by Mishkin and Portes, inter alios, but was not. After all, it could be argued that just as 
very few anticipated the subprime crisis, so likewise it might have been difficult to predict the 
Icelandic banking crisis. The second issue is that the two reports raise some interesting 
questions that go to the heart of conflicting methodologies in economics and the role of 
paradigmatic assumptions. It will be argued that the failure to see the impending Icelandic 
banking crisis was similar to the failure of Greenspan and many other mainstream economists to 
foresee the subprime crisis. This was due an uncritical reliance on broad published 
macroeconomic indicators and macroeconomic statistical relationships and a belief in the 
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assumption of the efficiency of financial markets and the effectiveness of light regulation. As a 
result of this, so the argument goes, there is, a priori, no need for any detailed investigation of 
the various institutions involved. 
Although couched in diplomatic language (Gylfason, 2010), the conclusions of the SIC are 
clear-cut. The Icelandic banking collapse is a story of reckless expansion after financial 
deregulation, totally inadequate regulatory control and also regulatory capture, opaque financial 
accounting and bank reports, serious conflicts of interest and fraud.4 It was likely that 2006 was 
the last date by which policies could have been introduced to save the banking system (Flannery 
2009). 
So why was it missed by so many and, in particular, by Mishkin and Portes?  
 
2   THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ICELANDIC BANKING SYSTEM 
 
In this section, we briefly set out the background concerning the Icelandic banks for the 
subsequent discussion. Wade/Sigurgeirsdóttir (2010: 11), in particular, have traced the close ties 
of the political parties to commerce and finance in the early post-war period where ‘market 
transactions became political and personal, as credit and jobs were allocated by calculation of 
mutual advantage’. This patronage was increasingly challenged in the 1970s and, in 1991, the 
Independence Party came to power committed to implementing the neoliberal philosophy of 
deregulation. Yet, paradoxically, it merely replaced one set of patronage with another. Financial 
deregulation began in 1994 when Iceland, as part of the European Free Trade Area, joined with 
the countries of the European Economic Community to form the European Economic Area 
(EEA). This gave it access to the European financial markets, subject to EU financial regulatory 
rules that had to be incorporated in Icelandic law, as was the case for other EEA countries. 
Nevertheless, this gave a false sense of security as it turned out that there was financial fragility 
and the lack of a coherent regulatory framework across Europe in dealing with cross-border 
banking issues.  
 In the late 1990s, the financial sector did not play a major role in the Icelandic economy. It 
was small and consisted mainly of publicly owned banks. But this was to radically change in the 
early 2000s when the major banks were privatised. The privatisation of the banks displays all 
the characteristics of cronyism emphasised by Wade and Sigurgeirsdóttir. Landsbanki was sold 
to the Samson group comprising of three wealthy Icelandic business associates with strong 
political connections. They had “no previous experience of significant ownership in an Icelandic 
financial institution” (SIC, 2008, cited by Johnsen, 2014, table 5.1: 65). There was initially a 
stated government goal of involving   in the purchase, but this was not enforced.  The sale of the 
 
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banks was handled by a Committee of Privatization (CoP) and, as result of the selection of 
Samson, one member resigned “and claimed that he had never witnessed such 
unprofessionalism during his 11 years of service for the CoP” (Johnsen, 2014, p.67). The sale of 
Bunadarbanki5 went to the S-Group, another Icelandic cabal with strong political connections. 
One of the conditions of the purchase was again that a reputable overseas bank should be an 
investor. When the purchase agreement was signed, the S-Group revealed that the international 
financial institution was a privately owned German bank, Hauck & Aufhäuser. It later transpired 
that nobody in the German bank knew anything about the purchase or had even heard of 
Bunadarbanki (Johnsen, 2014: 71. See also OECD, 2009: 19). 
 Consequently, the Icelandic banking system became highly concentrated with a few large 
shareholders and close ties to the political elite, which included all the major political parties. It 
was a curious mix of free market deregulation, neoliberalism and crony capitalism. 
The Icelandic banks initially attracted high ratings from the international rating agencies, 
primarily because of their close political links and implicit government support. There was also 
a hybrid merger of the investment banks with the commercial banks, with no sharp demarcation 
between them. Until the rapid development of the banking system, Iceland had been heavily 
dependent upon only two export activities, namely, fishing and aluminium. Hence, there was a 
deliberate attempt to diversify and turn Iceland into a low-tax financial sector based on the 
Swiss model.  
The strategy of the banks was to borrow heavily in the foreign capital markets (especially the 
European Medium Term Note Market) to finance loans made to only a few Icelandic investment 
companies, such as Baugur and Samson. These companies were controlled by the main 
shareholders in the banks. The investment companies, in turn, used the loans to buy substantial 
equity stakes in foreign firms including high profile retail companies. By the end of 2007, the 
three largest banks relied on short-term financing for three-quarters of their funds, nearly all 
obtained from abroad.6 The OECD (2009: 22) likened Iceland’s international investment 
position to the ‘balance sheet of a hedge fund, with large debt-finance equity positions’. This 
posed two systemic risks.  
The first was that if the prices of the international equities collapsed and the firms became 
insolvent, this would lead to a serious credit loss to the banks. Secondly, the banks relied 
 
5
 Bunadbanki later merged with a small brokerage firm and became Kaupthing, but its ownership 
remained largely the same.
6
 58% of their overall income was derived from branches located abroad. The net external debt increased 
by 142% of GDP over the next four years and most of this was due to the banks’ overseas borrowings. 
The net equity assets as a percentage of GDP grew to 99% of GDP, extraordinarily large by international 
standards.
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heavily on the wholesale financial markets, rather than expanding through the growth of 
domestic deposits.  
There was widespread conflict of interest in the privatised banking system right from the 
beginning. The owners of all the big three banks also became the major borrowers from the 
banks, at low rates of interest. They also received preferential treatment from the banks’ 
subsidiaries, such as the investment banks (SIC 2010a). Thus, the owners were the principal 
borrowers and their debts in many cases exceeded the total equity of the banks.  
In many cases, the activities of the owners were a classic case of Ponzi finance. They 
borrowed heavily from a bank using the proceeds to buy shares in the very same bank, driving 
up the price of the bank’s shares. At other times, they purchased shares in one of the other big 
banks; the owners of which reciprocated: a practice known as ‘cross financing’. All the banks 
purchased their own shares in automatically matched trades in the Stock Exchange in an 
‘attempt to elicit abnormal demand for their own shares’ (SIC 2010a, chapter 2: 8). A vicious 
circle developed as, when the crisis unfolded, the more the shares dropped in value, the more 
the owners purchased their banks’ shares in an attempt to stave off the impending crisis.  
The SIC came to the conclusion that this and the excessive leverage threatened the stability of 
the banking system long before the collapse. But there was also a related effect. The apparently 
larger equity base provided the foundations for rapid growth, but one that led to an increase in 
operational risk. The eventual collapse in the banks’ share price was not the fundamental cause 
of the problem; it was a consequence of the risks already inherent in the Icelandic banking 
system. 
This was also aided and abetted by expansionary policies of the Iceland government, which 
cut direct and indirect taxes. Furthermore, the relaxation in the guidelines for housing loans in 
2004 was also imprudent. These led to major macroeconomic imbalances in the economy, 
which, by themselves, would have led to the hard lending. 
The SIC concluded that the CBI knew of the weaknesses of the banks yet did nothing to 
prevent them and continued to make huge loans to the banks against the ‘weak equity’ (the 
banks’ own shares that was used to provide collateral) that was barely compatible with the legal 
provision of valid collateral. What is interesting is that the parlous state of the banking system 
was known to the CBI and also to the banking regulators long before the crash. The SIC report 
considers that 2006 was probably the last chance the government had of taking decisive action 
to prevent the crash. 
Consequently, by 2006, the signs for all to see were that there was a crisis looming, but 
perhaps not that it would lead to a financial meltdown. The Government set up an ad hoc 
coordination committee, although it proved largely ineffective.  
The details of the Icelandic crisis are well-known and need not detain us to long. The rapid 
growth of the three Icelandic banks was accompanied by increasing fragility, for the reasons 
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noted above. The proximate cause of the crash was the freezing of the international financial 
markets in mid 2007 due to the subprime crisis. The Icelandic banks had extensively borrowed 
short-term from these markets. The consequent move to a greater reliance on off-shore deposits 
from the on-line banks Icesave and Kaupthing Edge could not offset the rapid withdrawal of 
wholesale deposits in foreign currency. In the end, the banks collapsed because the CBI could 
not act as the lender of last resort for foreign currency. 
 
3 TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD THE BANKING CRASH HAVE BEEN FORESEEN? 
 
Concerns were building up in 2005 and were explicit by 2006. Johnsen, who had worked at 
the IMF on credit crises (see Hilbers et al., 2005) was particularly worried and expressed 
concern to several Icelandic authorities. Under certain conditions, the rapid growth of credit, 
such as Iceland was experiencing, is a clear indication of an impending banking crisis. 
Empirical research suggests that there is a credit boom if the growth of real credit exceeds 17% 
per annum and about 50% over a three-year period (Hilbers et al., 2005). This should have set 
alarm bells ringing in the case of Iceland. The three-year cumulative percentage growth rates 
since 2000 were 42.7 (2000); 44.8 (2001); 45.28 (2002); 36.80 (2003); 44.57 (2004); 77.11 
(2005); 97.64 (2006); and 77.88 (2007). Concerned by such findings (see Vidskiptabladid, 
2007), Johnsen approached the CBI, the Prime Ministry of Iceland and the FME; none were 
interested in discussing the matter with her. 
The credit rating agencies expressed doubts about the banking system at this time and 
downgraded the banks ratings, only to upgrade them shortly after, having been convinced by the 
banks that there was nothing fundamentally wrong. Particularly influential was the Merrill 
Lynch report of 7 March 2006, ‘Icelandic Banks – Not what You are Thinking’. (See also Fitch, 
2006a; 2006b and 2006c.) The Danske Bank report on 21 March 2006, ‘Iceland: Geyser Crisis’, 
argued that many of the macroeconomic indicators for Iceland were worse than those for 
Thailand, immediately before the 1997 Asian crisis and Turkey before the 2001 crisis. As 
Johnsen (2014: 84) notes the authors of the report ‘were sufficiently specific in their analysis for 
anybody with any knowledge of the matter to take notice’.7 
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 Jónsson (2009: 77), even with the benefit of hindsight, dismisses the Dankse report merely as an attempt 
‘to step into the limelight and garner international exposure for its research team by reporting on the hot 
topic of the day’. The rapid increase in spreads on Icelandic banks in 2006 was simply due to a few hedge 
funds acting out of anti-Icelandic sentiment more than anything else (p.74). What is interesting is that 
Johnson was Head of Research and Chief Economist at Kaupthing Bank.
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Aliber also expressed concern in 2006.8 Looking back on the crisis, Aliber/Zoega (2011: 5) 
wrote that, because of the macroeconomic imbalances, the huge current account deficit (even 
when excluding FDI), the rapid increase in the prices of stocks and of the assets of the big three 
banks, ‘it was also obvious that Iceland would experience a crash like the one observed in 
Mexico and Thailand, since a ‘limit theorem’ applies to the external indebtedness of a country, 
which cannot increase relative to its GDP for an extended period’.  
The IMF in its Staff Report on Iceland of 13th July 2006 expressed guarded worries about the 
financial sector, although they had to accept the traditional indicators that the financial sector 
was healthy.  
The first major report to contradict such concerns was that of Mishkin/ Herbertsson (2006) to 
which we turn next. 
 
3.1 ‘Financial Stability in Iceland’. The report by Mishkin and Herbertsson (May 2006) 
The core of Mishkin’s (2006) report is the discussion of what is seen as the three main routes 
to financial instability. These are (i) ‘financial liberalization with inadequate prudential 
regulation and supervision’ (p.36), (ii) ‘severe fiscal imbalances’ (p.39) and (iii) ‘imprudent 
monetary policy’ (p.40). None of these were considered to present a major problem for Iceland, 
but it is useful to consider the report under these headings to see how they stand up to scrutiny. 
The Mishkin report draws heavily on published financial and other indicators from which 
inferences are drawn. It clearly was not considered necessary by Mishkin to put the privatization 
and growth of the banks into a political and historical context. There was no detailed discussion 
about the functioning of specific financial institutions and their performance, beyond assuming 
that the banks operated in a prudent manner and financial regulation by the Financial 
Supervisory Authority (FME) was effective. 
 
3.1.1 ‘Financial Liberalization with Weak Prudential Regulation and Supervision’ 
 
The report outlines the causes of financial crisis, following Mishkin (1992), who attributes 
them to a combination of asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard. The first, 
drawing on the work of Akerlof (1970) and the ‘market for lemons’, occurs when the lenders in 
the debt and equity markets have difficulty in differentiating whether a borrower represents a 
good or bad risk. Under these circumstances, the financial markets will not function well and 
credit rationing will occur. Adverse selection results when, with high interest rates, only those 
 
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 Alber, in 2006, on the basis of publically available data, considered Iceland’s financial rise to be “the 
perfect bubble”. In May 2008, giving a seminar at the University of Iceland, he opined that the Icelandic 
banks only had nine months left before they would collapse (Lewis, 2010: 215-216). 
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with very risky projects will seek funds. Thus, even a small rise in the interest rate can lead, 
according to Mishkin, to a large decrease in lending as banks become increasingly concerned 
about adverse selection. Moral hazard occurs after a loan has been granted and is where the 
borrower engages in activities that if known by the lender, would not have led to the loan being 
advanced.  
Mishkin’s definition of financial instability (2006: 31) emphasises the risks posed to the banks 
by poor performing loans rather than the risks generated by the banks themselves. It is assumed 
that without informational failures, the banks will optimally allocate financial capital rather than 
themselves generating financial instability and the misallocation of capital. But, in the case of 
Iceland, the instability almost entirely came from the risky actions of the banks. 
Mishkin notes that bank instability generally occurs immediately after financial liberalisation, 
when regulation is in its infancy and is not particularly effective, because of lack of regulatory 
experience. He thus tended to discount poor regulation and lack of banking expertise as a 
problem in Iceland, as the process of financial deregulation in Iceland was concluded about ten 
years earlier in 1995 (see Mishkin 2006: 8). But what he overlooks is that it was only in 2003 
that the privatization of the banks was finalized. It was then that the incentive structure of the 
banks mangers’ and employees changed with the widespread introduction of the use of stock-
options and bonuses. This lead to greater risk taking in search for higher rates of return and the 
banks started on their policy of extremely rapid growth. It also led to misreporting of the 
accounts (Johnsen 2014: chapter 14). Mishkin was well aware of this rapid growth, but does not 
express any concern. According to the Report, the banks had more than enough time since 1995 
to ‘develop the expertise to manage risk’ given by the new opportunities that deregulation 
brought. However, until 2003 the Icelandic banks undertook what was essentially vanilla 
banking that did not need detailed regulating. 
The new owners of the banks had virtually no experience of banking. The banks grew rapidly 
by both internal growth (making more loans) and external growth (buying up other financial 
institutions or other assets). The problem of the former is that with its rapid growth the quality 
of the loans decreases and the management of the loans becomes poorer. This can give rise in 
future years to problems of default. There was an exceptionally rapid growth of the banks in 
both these areas from 2003.9 By 2006, from the published figures, it should have been apparent 
that the banks’ asset portfolio was one of high risk (see SIC 2010a, chapter 21: 3).  
Mishkin (2006: 8) asserted, however, there was no cause for concern as ‘prudential regulation 
and supervision is generally quite strong’. The financial regulator is the Financial Supervisory 
Authority (FME), which is independent of the CBI. According to Mishkin (2006: 42), ‘in 
 
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 External growth rates were 57.5 % in 2004 and 24.7 % in 2005, and in organic growth was 43.5 % 
(2004) and 59.5% (2005).
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contrast to the inadequate prudential supervision in countries that have experienced financial 
instability, Iceland’s prudential supervisors are seen as honest and competent. Their statements 
that the banking system is safe and sound should be taken at face value’. The evidence is based 
largely on a number of highly aggregate indicators such as the corruption perception index and 
economic freedom index constructed for individual countries, which place Iceland in a 
favourable light. However, this is clearly no substitute for a detailed assessment of the financial 
structure of the Icelandic banking system. 
Consequently, the regulatory powers of the FME were seen as comprehensive and sufficient 
by Mishkin. But were there any indications in 2006 that the FME would turn out to be so 
ineffective as documented by the SIC and Johnsen (2014)? In particular, was there any evidence 
that the resources and expertise of the FME had not matched the rapid growth and increasing 
complexity of the banking system?  
Wade/ Sigurgeirsdóttir (2012b) note that the offices of the FME were physically decrepit and 
the financiers and bank officials were scornfully dismissive when called to meetings there. The 
website of the FME, and its annual reports, make the FME appear very professional. However, 
even a cursory glance at the very small size of the FME’s staff readily available in these reports 
should have raised some questions. Moreover, the FME lacked the necessary information 
technology and computer experts for continuous financial monitoring, so that the FME ‘did not 
really have the foresight of the activities of the financial institutions that was so urgently 
needed’ (SIC 2010a, chapter 21:100). Furthermore, the turnover of the staff of the FME was 
high, especially in the two divisions covering the credit and securities market, as employees 
moved to the better paid private sector jobs.  
But the position was worse than this. ‘The FME did not sufficiently concern itself with some 
basic questions, such as the size of the banking system, and the Authority’s necessary reactions 
in regard to its much too rapid growth’ (SIC 2010a, chapter 21: 99). It furthermore lacked 
firmness to ensure that those decisions it made were implemented by the financial corporations, 
although it had the legal powers to do so. The FME, right up until the end of 2008, 
‘unreasonably’ (as the SIC put it) did not consider that there were any major problems 
threatening the banks. The stress tests of the FME were flawed, and gave a misleading 
impression of the banks’ situation. As Flannery (2009: 102) notes, ‘the questions raised [by 
outside analysts] about the Icelandic bank’s portfolios were quite specific, dealing with the 
extent of lending to related parties and credit risk concentrations’. One major problem was 
reflected in the repeated concerns about the limited information of the bank’s asset quality. The 
‘weak equity’ meant that the reported capital adequacy ratios were misleadingly high. 
The potential problems of the CBI lender of last resort were dismissed by the report as it was 
asserted that the CBI had international lines of credit, including those with the other Nordic 
countries. Unfortunately, these turned out to be inadequate and the SIC traces the growing 
    
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isolation of the Iceland authorities from the other Central Banks. The report also considered that 
the likelihood of a self –fulfilling prophecy of a run on the Icelandic banks (the existence of 
multiple equilibria), was small, because the underlying fundamentals of the economy were 
strong. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the crisis was the result of the rapid growth of the banking 
system with weak prudential regulation and supervision. Mishkin briefly touches on the first 
potential problem, the rapid (credit) growth of the banks, which is not assessed in any detail and 
dismissed with the comment ‘the banks are beginning to deal with this criticism by selling (or 
planning to sell) shares in companies where cross-ownership seems to be a potential problem’ 
(Mishkan, 2007: 53). They did not do nearly enough to reduce the systemic risk. 
 
3.1.2 ‘Severe Fiscal Imbalances’ 
 
Severe fiscal imbalances were dismissed as a cause for concern as the government was 
running a budget surplus over much of this period and government net debt fell from 31% of 
GDP in 2003 to a small net asset position of 0.8% in 2008. In retrospect, this was not the main 
cause of the banking crisis. Nevertheless, as the OECD (2009: 41) points out, ‘the government 
should have gone further, thereby providing a greater counterweight to the unsustainable boom 
in private domestic demand’.  
 
3.1.3 ‘Imprudent Monetary [and Fiscal] Policy’ 
 
The Mishkin report does not find anything much to criticise about the macroeconomic policy. 
However, prior to the mini crisis, the CBI had let, in the words of the OECD (2009: 33), an 
‘unsustainable, domestic-demand led boom’ develop; although the growth rate of output was 
rapid.10 This was accompanied by a stock market and house price bubble and the CBI’s 
monetary policy was not sufficiently restrictive. Taxes were lowered, purely for political 
reasons. The economy was overheating and there were concerns of a hard landing, especially if 
the exchange rate fell precipitously. Even without the banking crisis, it was predicted by the 
OECD that the economy would have experienced a decline in its growth rate. 
Mishkin also considered the current account deficit, which by 2005 was 26% of GDP. This is 
dismissed as a problem on the grounds of the neoclassical proposition that current account 
deficits could result from optimal behaviour on the part of households, firms, and governments. 
If the heroic assumptions are ignored, this statement could be reassuring. In other words, in 
much the same way as Lucas argues that theoretically there is no such thing as involuntary 
 
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 It averaged over 6% per annum in the four years up to 2007.
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unemployment and employment fluctuations are simply due to agents inter-temporally 
optimising their work-leisure trade-offs in the face of productivity shocks, so current account 
deficits are optimal as they are determined by the actions of rational optimising agents. Of 
course, as Mishkin points out, part of the deficit could be due to FDI in the aluminium industry, 
but this cannot explain the whole of the deficit, which was also driven by short-term capital 
flows (Danske 2006). Moreover, this had the effect of driving up the exchange rate to about 
25% above its equilibrium value. The share of household savings as a percentage of GDP was 
negative for much of this period. 
However, this ignores the extensive empirical evidence that there is a limit to the size of the 
net overseas debt to GDP ratio (about 50%) before the international foreign markets become 
exceedingly nervous and there is a balance-of-payments crisis and a currency crisis (see 
Catão/Milesi-Ferretti 2013). In 2005, the net overseas debt of Iceland had risen to just under 
150%, an increase of 40% in three years. Consequently, while the growth rate of economy 
would have probably slowed in 2007 as a consequence of the poor macroeconomic policies, it 
was not the major cause of the banking crisis and so we shall not consider it further. 
Mishkin (2010) later defends his report in these terms: ‘My co-author and I did correctly 
identify several risks to Iceland, including rapid credit growth, a lack of transparency in the 
banking system and the possibility that banks could experience refinancing problems’. This 
defence is not compelling. First, the report concludes unequivocally ‘The analysis in this study 
suggests that although Iceland’s economy does have imbalances that will eventually be 
reversed, financial fragility is not high, and the likelihood of a financial meltdown is very low’ 
(Mishkin 2006: 56). The only caveat expressed was the danger of a run on the banking system 
due to a self-fulfilling prophecy and, hence, the need to bolster confidence in the banks. The 
probability of a bank run was seen to be ‘small’, but the possibility could not ‘be ruled out, as 
with any risk’.11 Secondly, as far as we are aware, given that the report was used uncritically to 
increase confidence in the Iceland banks, nowhere in the public debate did Mishkin, inter alios, 
emphasise any of the, admittedly minor, concerns arising from his report. Moreover, the earlier 
concerns raised by the credit rating agencies and problems of the Iceland economy already in 
the public domain and emphasised by the Danske Bank (2006) report were largely ignored. 
 
 
 
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 It is interesting to note that Herbertsson, Mishkin’s co-author, was reported by the Financial Times as 
late as March 2008 as considering that the situation was close to ‘becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy’ 
(Ibison 2008). It was just the result of ill-informed opinions by the international financial of the state of 
the banks. Portes was also reported as expressing the same sentiments.
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3.2 ‘The Internationalisation of Iceland’s Financial Sector.’ The report by Portes and 
Baldursson (November 2007) 
 
The Portes report was published at the end of the mini crisis in November 2007, but just 
before the subprime crisis had its major impact. Like the Mishkin report, it concentrated mainly 
on published financial indicators which, apart from those relating to the current account, were 
uncritically accepted. This is especially true with regard to the published data on the banks, such 
as the rate of returns on assets and equity and the capital ratios. The mini-crisis is dismissed 
primarily as an ‘informational crisis’ (Portes et al. 2007: 1). The implication is that while there 
were indeed problems in disclosure and transparency, there were no fundamental problems with 
the banks’ viability and the crisis was not due to shocks to the sector. This, according to the 
report, is evidenced by the fact that there was no increase in debt default. Moreover, the 
‘Icelandic financial sector responded quickly and decisively’ (Portes et al. 2007: 1) to the mini 
crisis. The resilience of the financial system ‘has proved excellent’ (Portes et al. 2007: 2). The 
deposit base was expanded and cross-holdings were largely eliminated and there was greater 
disclosure in the banks’ accounts.  
Certainly, the banks did change their strategy as they diversified away from the wholesale 
markets by expanding their deposit base by aggressive expansion in the retail banking sector in 
European countries. This was done by offering higher interest rates compared with other 
European banks. In fact ‘the February 2006 turbulence worked as an alarm bell putting the 
banks in a much stronger position to come through the current liquidity squeeze unscathed’ 
(Portes et al. 2007: 20). 
However, there is no compelling evidence for this view. While the banks did make some 
attempt to adjust in response to the financial markets concerns, ‘some of the banks’ responses to 
the analyst’s criticisms were more directed at style than substance’ (Flannery 2009: 99). It 
addressed the form but not the substance of the financial markets’ concerns. Moody’s in January 
2008 placed Landsbanki on review for a potential downgrade because of its heavy reliance on 
internet deposit accounts (such as Icesave). Moreover, the increase in retail deposits did not 
offset the loss in the wholesale deposits. The banks continued to prop up their own shares by 
issuing loans that were used for their purchase. And while they attempted to reduce the degree 
of cross-holdings, there was a rapid growth in loans to ‘holding companies’ that were 
considered to be closely related to the banks and were therefore questionable creditors.12 
Nevertheless, the report notes that Iceland banks had lower ratings than the Nordic banks. ‘We 
 
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 As Jännäri (2009: 30, emphasis in the original) commented ‘Even if the number of large exposures in 
these banks was small, it is still very unusual that banks as large as these should have so many large 
exposures of this nature. My judgement is that their behaviour in this regard has been very imprudent’. 
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see no justification for this in their risk exposure’ (Portes et al. 2007: 1). The fact that the 
Icelandic banks did have a higher than average risk profile than the other Nordic countries is, 
according to the report, ‘compensated by unusually high capital ratios’. However, this overlooks 
the fact that the quality of the banks’ assets was considerably weaker than the published figures 
suggest. There are other factors that cast doubt on the strength of the Icelandic banks including 
the high degree of ‘weak equity’, risky lending to, for example, construction companies, and 
dubious accounting practices. Flannery (2009: 102, emphasis added) summarises it succinctly 
when he writes: ‘Although their [the Icelandic banks’] accounting standards showed high asset 
quality, high earnings and high capitalization, all three characteristics depended on an important 
managerial judgement: the accuracy of the banks’ loan loss allowance’.13 
What is remarkable is that even as the crisis deepened, the incident of delinquent loans 
reported by the banks barely altered. (Portes sees this as an indication of the strength of the 
banks, whereas Flannery suggests it should have sounded warning bells.) There is evidence 
reported in the SIC (2010a) that the banks engaged in renegotiating delinquent loans rather than 
declare them as in default.14  
So if this is correct, what did this imply about the effectiveness of financial regulation of the 
banks? Nothing, according to the report – ‘it has proven to be excellent’ (p.2). Like the Mishkin 
report, the Portes report considered that the financial regulation, as it was determined by the 
international standards, was strong (p.14). The FME has ‘considerable enforcement powers’ 
with which to monitor and enforce prudent behaviour of the banks (p.14). Moreover, the FME 
‘budget has recently been doubled to enable it to keep pace with the rapid growth of the 
financial sector’. However, the FME was markedly understaffed in 2007 and there was no 
evidence of any dramatic increase in resources to the FME during the rapid expansion of the 
banks until 2007.  
The problem of the CBI acting as a lender of last resort is not seen as a major problem and is 
brushed aside in the Portes report. This is directly contradicted by the views of Johnsen (2007) 
and Buiter/Sibert (2008). The latter argued that because of the exposures to foreign deposits and 
loans, Iceland needed a foreign currency as well as a normal lender of last resort and the CBI 
 
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 The allowance for loan losses (ALL) is an important indicator of a bank’s profitability, but if it is 
understated it misleads investors about the quality of the loans, and produces artificially high returns on 
equity.
14
 There were other accounting methods used to prevent loans being written off. After all, a loan may 
eventually come good in the future even if it is with a very small probability. Also about half of the 
banks’ loans were zero-coupon loans where during the life of the loan, the borrower was not required to 
pay any interest or repay any of the loan (the interest is capitalised into the final repayment) so it was 
little wonder that delinquent payments were so low in the run up to the crisis. The loans did not generate 
any cash repayments which could be subject to a default.
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was simply incapable of playing this role. Hence, pace Portes, Iceland’s ‘ ‘business model’ is 
not viable’ (Buiter/Sibert 2008: 1). 
It is interesting to note though that Buiter and Sibert considered that ‘if, however, the 
authorities think that the Icelandic banks are fundamentally sound, and most knowledgeable 
economists, including the authors of two recent reports on Iceland’s economy and financial 
system (Mishkin/Herbertsson (2006) and Portes et al. (2007)) believe this to be true, then it is 
likely to be worth the risk to attempt to avert a crisis that could result in the insolvency of one or 
more of the banks.’ (Buiter/Sibert 2008: 2). Two comments are apposite at this stage. The first 
is not only did the authorities, broadly defined, know the banks were bordering on insolvency, 
but they were part of the cause of the problem. The second emphasises the influence of the 
Mishkin and Portes reports on the public perception of the crisis.  
So to what extent is the conclusion of the report justified? ‘Our view, which appears to be 
shared by the regulatory authorities (the [FME] and the CBI) is that these are in fact very well 
run banks. Their management is indeed entrepreneurial, but they are wary of becoming involved 
in anything they do not understand, and they are very focused on risk managements’ (Portes et 
al. 2007: 35). 
But all the detailed evidence based on how the banking system worked in practice and critical 
examination of their accounts at that time gives no support for this conclusion. Arguments about 
the effectiveness of the FME are merely an assertion in the report, backed up by no compelling 
evidence.  
The SIC report clearly demonstrated that the banks’ books were far from healthy. Ironically, 
Baldursson/Portes (2013), building on the study and statistics of the SIC, not surprisingly 
confirm the SIC’s findings about the behaviour of the bankers of Kaupthing in using the banks 
own funds in an attempt to maintain its share price.15 Yet curiously, they consider this to be case 
of what is known as ‘gambling for resurrection’. This occurs when the financial situation is so 
dire that a bank rationally undertakes high-risk financial activities, where there is the possibility 
of high rate of return, but with a low probability of success, in an attempt to stave off its 
collapse. The implication is that because the banks had such large exposures to the international 
financial markets, the freezing of international liquidity caused the banks to crash (as 
Buiter/Sibert (2008), but not Portes et al., (2007) warned about). Thus, the banks supposedly 
were sound in November 2007, but were caught out by the generally unforeseen subprime crisis 
and its contagion effect. Hence, their risky financial decisions should be seen in this light. 
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 Baldursson/ Portes (2013) do not mention the unequivocal position they took as late as 2008 that the 
Icelandic banking system was healthy. There is no reference to the interchange with Wade in the pages of 
the Financial Times or the warnings voiced in 2006 and discussed above. 
    

But, as Black (2014a and b) has, rather polemically, emphasised, this is a complete misreading 
of the evidence. The banks engaged in reckless behaviour right from the start of their 
privatisation acting solely in the interests of the few large shareholders, as noted above and 
shown by the SIC (2010a) and Johnsen (2014). The bank’s behaviour was not ‘gambling for 
resurrection’, but rather ‘looting’ in Akerlof and Romer’s (1993) sense of the term.16 (Black 
terms it ‘accounting control fraud’.) Given the close political networks, the absence of an 
effective regulatory body, perceived freedom from prosecution and the implicit guarantee from 
the government of a bailout, it becomes optimal to make high risk and fraudulent decisions if 
they are to the direct benefit of the owners, although there is a high probability of  loan default 
and even bankcruptcy. Akerlof /Romer (1993) produce a simple model illustrating how this can 
occur.  
 
4   CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
In this paper, we have contrasted two diametrically opposed views on the state of the Icelandic 
economy and its banking system. These were the views of Wade and Sigurgeirsdóttir, inter 
alios, and Mishkin and Portes. The importance of all these views is that they entered into the 
public arena as they were debated in the media and may well have influenced investors’ 
decisions about whether or not to make deposits with the Icelandic banking system. Indeed, it 
seems to have been the major aim of the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce, who commissioned 
the reports of both Mishkin and Portes, and the Icelandic government to convince the financial 
markets that there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the Icelandic banking system. The 
causes of the banking crash were exhaustively examined by the Special Investigation 
Commission and it is clear that the reports of Mishkin and Portes were far too sanguine, given 
the information available at the time, and the concerns of Wade and Sigurgeirsdóttir were 
vindicated. 
The question arises as to why there was such a divergence of opinions. The answer involves a 
consideration of the different underlying methodologies. The Mishkin and Portes reports drew 
largely on published data and they assumed that the banking data were reliable. They also made 
the erroneous assumption that the regulatory body (the FME) and the CBI were effective and all 
the banks were well managed. In the case of the Mishkin report, this was largely based simply 
on the fact that Iceland was an advanced country and a number of aggregate indices pointing to 
lack of corruption, etc. The Portes report drew uncritically on a number of banking indices such 
 
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 Gambling for resurrection is where a bank or financial institution gets into serious financial difficulties 
and takes high risk investment or loan decisions, but which will, if successful, bring a high return, albeit 
with a low probability.
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as the rate of return on equity and the capital ratios, without any explicit consideration as to 
whether these reflected the correct financial health of the banking system: they didn’t. Of 
course, it could be argued that only after the banks’ nationalization did the full extent of the 
degree of cross-holdings, poor quality loans to the owners, weak equity, and the misleading 
values of the capital ratios become apparent. However, it was these precise concerns that the 
rating agencies and others raised, which led to the mini-crisis of 2006.   
Implicit in both reports is an erroneous assumption that regulation was effective. This 
assumption receives support from the a priori belief in the efficient market hypothesis and that 
banks always behave largely in an ethical manner. Self-regulation by the financial sector itself 
and the fear of reputational damage is assumed to be sufficient to ensure the financial markets 
operate efficiently, with only the need for light government regulation. This was also at the 
heart of the approach of Greenspan and is one of the reasons why the subprime crisis was 
unanticipated by the Federal Reserve and the Federal Open Market Committee. 
Yet even a cursory knowledge of, for example, the US Savings and Loans debacle in the early 
1990s (Black, 2014a) and the partial failure of the regulatory bodies (in that crisis caused by 
lack of resources and political lobbying), and the bankruptcy of Enron and the complicity of the 
internal auditors (Arthur Andersen) should have raised severe doubts.  
Drawing inferences from merely a series of macroeconomic indicators and the mere existence 
of a regulatory body, supposedly following accepted international banking standards, produced 
an erroneous and misleading picture of the soundness of Iceland’s banking system.  As Wade 
and Sigurgeirsdóttir (2010, 2012a) have clearly shown, it was only from a detailed knowledge 
of the political and economic history and the complex political and financial interlinkages, 
including widespread political patronage, that a more sceptical and accurate picture emerges. In 
other words, it is an approach that emphasises the need for a detailed case study of the various 
institutions and the pressures exerted by them – the antithesis of the deductive approach 
inherent in neoclassical economics. 
In the wake of the crisis, the SIC also contained a working group on ethics (SIC, 2010b). It is 
worth citing one of their conclusions. ‘The most important lessons to draw from these events are 
about weak social structures, political culture and public institutions.’ This emphasises the need 
for what be best termed a political economy approach to understanding financial crises that 
involves more than just macroeconomic variables and their relationships. 
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